Marketization of production and the US-Europe employment gap by Schettkat, Ronald & Freeman, Richard B.
 Marketization of Production 
and the US–Europe Employment Gap 
 
Richard B. Freeman and Ronald Schettkat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2002
 
Abstract 
Women work much more in the US than in Germany and most other EU economies.  We find that the 
US–German employment gap is not strongly related to cross-country differences in the level of pay or 
social benefits.  The difference in employment is due to the different marketization of activities between 
the two economies:  German women work as many hours as US women when we consider time spent 
in household production as well as in market production. 
For instance, German women spend more time preparing meals while US women use take-out 
and restaurants more intensely.  The organization of some social activities, such as schooling, and the 
dispersion of skills, as well as pay differences, affect the degree of marketization. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
The US and major EU countries such as Germany1 had very different employment records in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  In the early 1970s the employment population rate was similar in the US and in major EU 
countries while unemployment rates were lower in the EU.  But in the 1980s and in the 1990s, the 
employment rate rose in the US to exceed that in the EU while the US unemployment rate fell to roughly 
half the EU level.  
 The two most popular explanations for the employment gap are that on the demand side the EU 
lost jobs because its wage-setting institutions compressed wage differentials below market levels; while 
on the supply side EU welfare state provisions led many to remain jobless longer than would otherwise 
be the case.  Our analysis and that of others shows that these hypotheses cannot explain the bulk of 
US–EU employment differences.  If the most popular explanations do not work, what does economics 
have to say about the causes of the differences?   
This paper argues that the low employment rate results from the greater marketization of work in 
the US than in the EU – the marketization hypothesis.  It presents evidence that the EU produces 
relatively more goods and services through household production and less through the market than the 
US and analyzes how this difference directly reduces employment in low-skilled service sectors and 
indirectly reduces the employment of highly educated women.  
Empirically, we use time budget data, consumer expenditure data, and measures of attitudes 
toward work along with wages and employment by sector to demonstrate the differing levels of 
marketization in the US and EU and assess the contribution of differences in marketization to the 
employment gap.  We argue that an advanced economy can achieve a low employment-population 
rate/high share of home production equilibrium per the EU; or a high employment-population rate/high 
share of market production equilibrium per the US.  While our data deal with Germany and the US, our 
findings reflect the difference between EU and American models of capitalism more broadly. 
 
                                                 
1 If not stated otherwise, Germany refers to West-Germany in this paper.  
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1.  Conventional Wisdom and the Employment Gap 
 
In the1980s and 1990s the US had a 10 percentage point higher rate of employment to adult population 
than Germany.  The difference is due to a higher employment population rate in service sectors (see 
Table 1).  Throughout the period Germany had more employees per adult in manufacturing and 
agriculture than the US but fewer employees per adult in services than the US. From 1970 to 1995 
manufacturing and agricultural employment per adult fell by 0.15 points in Germany compared to 0.05 
points in the US while service sector employment per adult grew in Germany by 0.10 points compared 
to 0.15 points in the US.  Service employment per adult and industry and agriculture employment per 
adult in Germany in 1995 were comparable to US levels in 1970.  If we view the increase in service 
sector employment as the “natural” path for advanced capitalist systems, Germany is roughly 25 years 
behind the United States.  The fact that the US–German jobs gap occurs in the service sector raises the 
fundamental issue from the 1960s structuralist–aggregate demand debates over whether the composition 
of employment can affect the aggregate level of joblessness. 
The smaller number of service jobs per adult in Germany than in the US shows up in both the 
least skilled service sectors and in high-tech and high skilled service sectors.  The conventional 
explanation of the US–EU employment gap focuses on the relative dearth of low skilled service sector 
jobs in the EU because of the consequences on joblessness and social exclusion.  It links the 
employment gap in those sectors to low demand for low skill service work due to excessively high EU 
wages for low skilled workers and to low supply of low skill service workers due to high social benefits. 
 This supply–demand story fits with the aggregate differences between the US and EU.  But it does not 
fit with disaggregated data on sectoral wages and employment or estimates of the elasticity of demand 
and supply for workers with differing skills. The implication is that the conventional analysis can only tell 
a small part of the employment gap story.  
One other feature of the US–German employment gap deserves attention.  This is the 
concentration of the gap among women.  In 1995 the ratio of female employment to the female 
population was 55.3% in Germany vs. 65.8% in the US, producing a 10.5 percentage point gap; while 
the ratio for men was 73.9% in Germany vs. 79.5% in the US, producing a 5.6 percentage point gap.  
Table 2 shows that the lower employment of women in Germany than in the US occurs for women with 
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and without children; for women in all skill categories.  In addition, it shows that a substantial and rising 
proportion of American women are in the top earnings categories.  For example, among those who earn 
over 1.66 times the mean earnings the share of women is 19.5%  (up from 8.4% in 1970).  By contrast, 
the share of German women among those who earn 1.66 times mean earnings is just 0.3% (up from 
0.0% in 1970).  There are some differences in the magnitude of the employment gaps – they are highest 
for women without children and for those in the lowest skill categories, but what is striking is that there 
are large gaps for all groups.  Since women who do not work in the market sector usually work in the 
household sector, this difference reflects differences in the marketization of the economies.  It is an 
important clue as to why the US and Germany differ so much in service sector employment. 
 
The labor demand side story 
 
The demand side of the conventional story is that among low skilled workers employment rose in the 
US because real or relative earnings fell along a given demand curve while in the EU employment fell 
along a given demand curve due to institutionally determined real wage increases.  
Many studies have tried to find the posited inverse relation between wages and employment 
growth at the sectoral level in the EU (Card, Kramarz and Lemieux, 1994; Katz, Loveman and 
Blanchflower, 1995; Krueger and Pischke, 1999; Freeman and Schettkat, 1999) and could not find 
such in the data.  Noting that that unemployment rates were higher for all groups in the EU than in the 
US Nickell and Bell (1996) also rejected the demand side story.  
The problem that industry level data poses for the conventional story can be seen in Figures 1 
and 2.  Figure 1 compares differences in employment–population rates and in relative wages by industry 
between Germany and the US.  If the conventional story were correct, we would expect that the 
Germany–US employment–population rate gap would be larger when the German–US relative wage 
ratio was larger.  The figure shows no such pattern.  Figure 2 links the difference in changes of the 
national employment–population rates per industry to the difference in changes of industry-specific wage 
in a difference in difference analysis.  Again, if the conventional story was correct, the change in the 
employment gaps by industry would be related to the change in wage gaps by industry.  But the scatter 
plot shows little relationship between the change in relative wages across the countries and  the change 
in relative employment. 
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Furthermore, in Freeman and Schettkat (2001a) we find that despite the well-known differences 
in wage-setting institutions relative industry mean wages (the mean wage of an industry divided by the 
overall mean wage) are very similar in the US and in Germany.  The correlation of the relative industry 
mean wage between the countries is 0.78.  But behind the similar relative industry mean wages are very 
different intra-industry wage distributions, which are generally much wider in the US. 
Freeman and Schettkat (1999) made several estimates of the elasticity of demand for skilled vs. 
unskilled workers for Germany and the US and came up with a modestly-sized elasticity for the US and 
a negligible one for Germany that could explain little of the differential employment experience between 
the two countries.  Estimates of the elasticity of demand for US minimum wage workers hover around -
0.10.  If we apply this estimate to aggregate less skilled worker employment, at most 5 percent of the 
German–US employment–population gap can be attributed to the 20–25% differences in real wage 
growth between the US and Germany over the 1970–1995.2 
Some may argue that the data for industry–occupation comparisons across countries is too 
weak to weigh heavily in rejecting the standard demand story.  But evidence from the US also 
contradicts the story: employment and hours grew among workers whose wages went up the most, not 
among the less skilled whose wages fell relative to the average (Freeman, 1995).  The huge rise in 
female employment was accompanied by a rise in the female/male earnings gap, not by a fall in that 
ratio.  The positive association of changes in relative wages and relative employment are not readily 
consistent with a story of employment that makes movement along a demand curve the major factor in 
job creation.  And in both Germany and the US, employment grew more in high wage industries than in 
low wage industries.3 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2  Assume as a rough approximation that 20% of the German work force is low skilled.  Then a 25% wage reduction 
would increase employment by 2.5%.  This would increase the total employment population ratio by 0.5 points (=.20 x 
2.5). 
3  We regressed the difference in country-specific changes in employment-population rates on the difference in 
relative industry wages in 1970 and obtained positive coefficients on the difference in relative wages.  High paying 
industries were growing more than the low-paying industries.  That low-wage industries are growing faster than high 
wage industries is a myth, both in the US and in Germany.   
 5 
The labor supply story 
 
The supply side story that social benefits reduced the supply of workers to low wage service sector jobs 
in the EU runs into serious problems when we examine the German benefit structure.(see Table 3).  In 
1995 the German social assistance program offered a monthly benefit of 1105 marks to single jobless 
persons, to which they could add 200 marks through earnings before they lost benefits.  Given average 
monthly working hours of 169 this translates into 7.7 marks per hour.  Workers should thus reject any 
jobs that offer less than 7.7 marks per hour.  As workers receive paid vacation time as well as hourly 
pay, however, the minimal reservation wage should be somewhat lower – about 12% lower by our 
estimate, or 6.9 marks.  Adding the workers’ social security contributions of 20% in 1995 produces a 
social minimum determined reservation wage of 8.24 marks, which is about 29 percent of the average 
wage.  Even ignoring the impact of paid vacation time, the social minimum determined reservation wage 
is 9.3 marks or 32% of the mean wage.  In the US social benefits are virtually non-existent for single 
men, but the US has a minimum wage that effectively rules out most very low-paying jobs.  In 1995 the 
minimum was 34% of the average wage.  These calculations make it hard to argue that Germany has 
fewer low wage workers than the US because of the social minimum.  In neither country are many 
workers paid a third or less of the average wage.  The largest group of minimum wage workers in the 
US are teenagers, who in Germany would be in apprenticeship programs and thus out of the job 
market.4 
 
 
2.  The Marketization Hypothesis 
 
If the demand and supply parts of the conventional story cannot explain the US–EU employment rate 
gap, what else could account for the divergence in employment rates?  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4  Social assistance could still affect the employment structure through the demand side.  Tax charges for social 
assistance on employers of low wage workers are considerably higher in Germany than in the US.  German employers 
pay 20 percent social security charges (compared to 7.5 percent for US employers) and about 12 percent higher wages 
because of legally required vacation time (compared to about 4 percent higher wages due to vacation in the US).  
These differences could reduce employment among low wage workers in Germany compared to the US.  But the lack 
of any relation between changes in employment and wages by sector suggests that this will be a difficult proposition 
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We hypothesize that the missing factor is the different marketization of the US and EU 
economies.  The marketization hypothesis explains the US–German difference in employment in 
terms of the way the differing locus of production between the market and household impacts the 
market demand for labor.  By producing goods in the market, the US creates demand for low skill 
labor; whereas by producing goods at home, Germany does not create such demands.  Firms combine 
high skilled workers and lower skilled workers to produce commodities and services; whereas 
households rely on the skills of their members.  As long as some skilled and educated persons produce 
in the household, rather than buying in the market, the demand for low skill labor will be less in the 
economy with greater household production.  At the same time, market alternatives to household 
production the US makes it easy for educated women to work in the market, whereas in Germany the 
lack of such alternatives makes full-time employment of women difficult.  Differences in work time fit 
well with the marketization story.  By working long hours and taking short vacations, Americans earn 
money to buy goods in the market.  By working fewer hours and taking long vacations, Germans have 
more time to produce goods at home.  
To the extent that the US economy offers greater opportunities to substitute market production 
for household production, we also expect greater responsiveness of Americans than Germans to factors 
that increase the incentive to work and conversely smaller responsiveness of Americans than Germans 
to factors that decrease the incentive to work. 
 To what extent does data support the claimed greater marketization of the US than Germany? 
 
Consumption 
 
If Americans buy goods in the market that Germans produce at home, we would expect  Americans to 
spend a larger proportion of their incomes on private consumption than do Germans.  That Americans 
consume more and save less than Germans is well-established, though there are other explanations for 
this pattern.  The marketization hypothesis also predicts, however, differences in the way Americans and 
Germans combine market goods and time to produce final consumption and in the pattern of 
consumption items.  Americans should spend more on market-produced final goods while Germans 
                                                                                                                                                        
to establish empirically. 
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spend more on intermediate goods to produce final commodities in the household.   
Table 4 contrasts the distribution of non-medical consumption expenditures in the US and 
Germany in current prices as recorded in national income accounts.5  We exclude medical expenditures 
because of the drastically different way the US and Germany provide medical services.  The US uses 
private spending paid by private insurance to a relatively greater extent than public medical expenditures, 
while Germany like most EU countries relies largely on public spending. 
Consider first expenditures on the broad food, beverages, tobacco, and miscellaneous category. 
 In 1994 both American and German households spent about 30% of their incomes on food and 
beverages.  But they spent this money in different ways.  In the US more than half of spending in this 
area (16.7 points out of 30.3 points) went to restaurants and miscellaneous goods and services.  In 
Germany only 25% of the spending (7.3 points out of 30.2 points) went to restaurants and related 
goods.  By contrast, in 1994 Americans spent 12.3 percent of non-medical consumption expenditures 
on food and beverages compared to 20.7 percent in Germany.  The 9.4 percentage point difference 
(16.7–7.3) in spending on restaurants and related services implies that at comparable levels of income 
the US demands considerably more production in that sector, and thus has greater derived demand for 
labor there.6   
The pattern of change in expenditures on restaurants also fits with this interpretation.  Between 
1970 and 1994, the restaurant and miscellaneous share of US consumption increased by 4.2 percentage 
points, whereas the restaurant and miscellaneous share of German consumption increased by 2.8 
percentage points.   
The proportion of consumer spending on the broad furniture, furnishing, and household 
equipment is also higher in Germany than in the US, but this does not reflect differences in the stock of 
durable household consumption items, which are similar in American and German households.  But the 
Americans have larger refrigerators and, presumably, other appliances as well.  These differences imply 
that Americans substitute household capital equipment for time in taking care of their homes.  Finally, 
                                                 
5 The distribution of expenditures in constant (1990) prices tells a comparable story.  
6  It is often argued that Germans and other Europeans spend their vacation in other countries and thus create service 
demand outside the domestic economy, i.e. in National Accounting terms they import services.  German households 
spend 4.9% of their overall expenditures abroad compared to only 1.4% of American households.  At the same, 
however, on residents purchase goods and services amounting to 3.3% of overall final consumption expenditure in 
Germany, the comparable US figure is 1.9%.  Thus the net effect of 'consumption trading' (for all products not only 
services) is -1.6 percentage in Germany but 0.5 in the US. 
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expenditures on personal care show that Americans spend proportionately more on this item, 3.5 
percent of consumption versus 1.9 percent spending by Germans.7 
Overall, Americans buy more services in the market than do Germans, who buy more goods 
used in household production.  
 
Time use 
 
The marketization hypothesis links differences in the allocation of time between Germans and Americans 
to the observed differences in market spending.  Germans should spend more time preparing food at 
home and in other forms of household production than Americans, who should spend more time 
working in the market.  To examine the differences in time use in the two countries, we turn to time 
budget studies.  The German data are derived from the scientific use file (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
1999) ‘Wo bleibt die Zeit?’  It was collected by means of diaries and personal interviews as described 
in the Appendix.  The US data was collected by the Survey Research Center at the University of 
Maryland.  It was collected by telephone interviews, based on a 24-hour diary, again as described in 
the Appendix.  
Table 5 shows the hours per week spent on meal activities in Germany and the US.  Germans 
spend 1.8 hours more time eating than Americans and 2.2 hours more time preparing meals, for a total 
of 4 hours of extra time per week eating and preparing meals.  Among women the difference is 
especially great – 2.1 hours more time eating and 4.1 hours more time preparing meals, for a differential 
of 6.2 hours per work.  Hours of shopping time, by contrast, differ only modestly between the countries. 
 Germans spend a bit more time shopping than Americans even though stores are open for fewer hours 
in Germany than in the US.  But Americans spend more time travelling for personal need than Germans. 
 If we sum all of these activities on the notion that they are all household production, we find that 
Americans spend less time than Germans in total. 
Table 6 displays time-use pattern in an average week for Americans and Germans in total and 
by gender.  The table differentiates between hours worked in the market, hours worked in household 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7 This result confirms our conclusion that the US-German service employment differences is not caused by 
differential rates of outsourcing of intermediate business services (see Freeman and Schettkat, 1998; Russo and 
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production, including childcare, cleaning, preparation of meals, and repairs, and hours spent on personal 
time.  Americans spend 5.3 hours more in market work than do Germans and spend 6 hours less in 
household production than Germans.  If we sum market time and household time and reported time 
spent on voluntary work, however, we get nearly same total hours worked, 53.6 hours in the US and 
54.6 hours in Germany.  The difference is that 59% of American work time is in the market compared 
to 48% of German work time.   
The allocation of time between the market and household differs most among women.  
American women spent 7.7 (44%) more hours in market work than German women, while German 
women spent one third more hours in household production.  The higher average market–work time of 
American women reflects the higher female labor force participation in the US and the greater hours 
worked by employed women in the US than in Germany.  Because the joblessness rate in Germany is 
higher than in the US, comparisons of time budgets that include the unemployment will overstate the time 
spent in home activities by employed Germans.  However, this effect appears to be modest.  Time use 
budgets limited to employed persons give results similar to those in Table 6.  
Table 6 divides leisure time into TV use and other activities.  Americans watch 5.5 hours more 
TV per week than Germans.  From one perspective, watching TV is a home activity.  It takes place in 
the household rather than in a market setting.  But from another perspective, it is  consumption of a 
market-produced item.  Employment per adult in the entertainment sector is, in fact, larger in the US 
than in Germany (see Table 1). 
 
Family composition and child care  
 
The presence of children is a key determinant of the allocation of time between the market and the 
household.  Women with young children spend more time in household production than other women.  
Men with young children, by contrast, work more hours in the market.  In the US in the 1950s women 
with children left the job market to be full-time at home.  This pattern disappeared in the latter half of the 
20th century, so that many women with young children worked.  German behaviour has changed less.  
Table 7 compares the allocation of time by women with and without children.  German women 
                                                                                                                                                        
Schettkat, 2001).  
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in families with at least one child under 6 years spend over 20 hours a week taking care of their child.  
American women in families with at least one child under 6 years just 11 hours a week taking care of 
their child – a 9 hour per week difference.  The difference in time spent taking care of children 
diminishes when we shift to women with children under 18 but there still remains a sizable 4.5 hours.  
Since Americans have more children than Germans these huge differences diminish when we look at the 
entire adult population.  But the fact that with fewer children, German women average more hours in 
child-rearing than Americans is striking.  Even men in Germany report spending more time in child care 
than American men. 
 
Attitudes toward market work 
 
The greater American than German attachment to market work shows up in responses to a variety of 
questions on attitudes toward work.  Table 8 summarizes data on work attitudes from the International 
Social Science Program (ISSP) surveys for the US and Germany.  The ISSP is a cross-country survey 
of attitudes toward issues of social import.  All countries are responsible for their own surveys but they 
ask the same questions on agreed-upon issues of social import and seek to maintain comparability in 
wording and design.  In 1989 and 1997 the ISSP focused on work and attitudes toward work.   
The ISSP asked workers about whether or not they worked so hard (in the market) as to 
interfere with their lives.  In 1989 many more Americans than Germans said that they worked sufficiently 
hard so as to interfere with their lives.  But in 1997 the proportions are similar.  The ISSP also asked 
workers in both countries their preferences between working more or less hours.  In 1989 Americans 
were far more likely to say that they wanted to work more hours than Germans.  In 1997, the pattern 
was similar but the difference between the countries was less.  Another question that casts light on the 
differential attachment of workers to the market is whether or not workers viewed their job as “just a 
way to earn money”.  In 1989 and in 1977 Germans and Americans answered quite differently.  In 
1989 39% of German men agreed that their job was “just a way to make money” while 46% disagreed 
with this statement – a 7 point difference.  Twenty-six percent of German women agreed while 58 
percent disagreed – a 32 point difference.  By contrast, just 24% of American men agreed with the 
statement while 59% disagreed – a 35 point difference; and just 20% of American women agreed while 
62 percent disagreed – a 42 point difference.  Between 1989 and 1997 the difference in responses 
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between Germans and Americans declined, but still Americans were more likely to view their job as 
more than a way of earning money than Germans.  In 1989 the percent disagreeing minus the percent 
agreeing was 7 points for German men and 32 points for German women compared to 35 points for 
American men and 42 points for American women.  The ISSP also asked workers if (assuming they 
had income to live on) they would continue at their job even without pay.  In 1989 proportionately more 
Americans were likely to respond positively than Germans, but in 1997 Germans were more likely to 
respond positively.  
In short, the attitudinal questions indicate that Americans are more attached to market work than 
Germans in 1980, but that the differences diminished from 1989 to 1997. 
 
 
3.  Does Marketization Explain the Employment Gap? 
 
The data examined thus far support the claim that the US has marketized more production than has 
Germany.  To estimate the extent to which marketization of activities contributes to the US–German 
employment gap, we undertake a two part analysis.  First, we estimate how many extra jobs Germany 
would have in the low skill service sector if Germans produced goods and services in the market to the 
same extent as Americans do.  Then, we contrast the impact of education and children on the allocation 
of time of German and American women in order to assess the possible “knock-on” effects that 
increased market production of low skill goods and services might have on the labor supply of more 
educated German women.   
 
Household production and less skilled market work 
 
If Germany reduced goods and services in the household to US levels and shifted production of those 
goods and services to the market, it would create additional demand for low skill workers.  Absent a full 
model of the routes by which such a shift occurs – through lower savings; spending shifts from less labor 
intensive to more labor intensive activities; increases in incomes created by increased marketization – we 
make “back of the envelope” estimates of the order of magnitudes that might be involved. 
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Our rough estimates suggest a large impact of marketization on the employment gap.  We 
assume that labor input coefficients in the sectors are constant so that a percentage increase in market 
spending produces a comparable increase in employment.8  With our data, we can undertake such an 
analysis for restaurants and related businesses.  Table 4 shows that US consumers spent twice as much 
on food in the market sector as Germans.  Table 5 shows that US adults spent 2.2 hours less preparing 
food in the household than Germans.  If Germany doubled its spending on restaurants to US levels and 
reduced household production of food, it would increase employment per adult in the restaurant sector 
by 3.5 employees per adult – 35% of the 10.0 employment gap (see Table 9).  Assuming that 
employees in the sector worked 30 hours per week, the marketization would increase weekly employee 
hours per adult by 105.  In turn, the reduction of 2.2 hours in household time implies a drop of 220 
hours of household work.  Since the same amount of food would be consumed in either case, this 
suggests that the market is approximately twice as productive as the household in producing meals.9   
This number seems plausible given that Germany has a sizeable “wedge” between producing something 
at home and paying no taxes on household production and buying a product in the market and paying 
income taxes and various charges on labor.  We estimate that the market would have to be at least 50% 
much more productive to compete with the household.10  If we take this analysis a step further and 
assume that Germans reduced all of their household production time to US levels, and that productivity 
in the market was twice that in the household, the switch from household to market would close the 
entire employment gap.   
In short, as far as we can tell from a rough and ready calculation, increased marketization in 
Germany would effectively resolve the employment gap with the US.  From one perspective, this is not 
surprising.  Table 5 showed that total work time of Germans and Americans was essentially the same.  It 
was the division between household and market that differentiated the economies.  Thus, changing that 
                                                 
8  With a fixed coefficient b, d E = Eo (dS)/So, where dE is the change in employment, Eo is employment before the 
change, dS is the change in sales, and So is sales before the change. 
9  Since the substitution is one from time spent in home cooking to time spent in restaurant cooking, this change 
should have only minimal consequences for employment in the rest of economy.  There may be some reduction in 
employment in retail food stores but there will be potential increase in employment in wholesale food stores due to 
the increased purchase by restaurants. 
10  Because workers pay a tax on their incomes and pay taxes on goods bought in the market, for the market to provide 
goods and services, it must have a productivity advantage on average.  Highly paid workers may buy goods and 
services in the market even if they are more productive in household production than the market, because of the 
difference between the own wage and the wage for a professional provider.  This is a story of comparative not 
absolute advantage. 
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division should bring German employment in the market closer to that of the United States.  Our 
restaurant and food example shows that marketization would directly raise employment in an affected 
less skilled service sector by a considerable amount.  But it is not only the less skilled service sectors 
that are likely to expand were Germany to marketize activities currently performed in the household. 
 
Market production and female workers  
 
Increased marketization of household production would “free up” the time of women to engage more 
fully in market activities.  Highly educated women and women with children, would likely be the biggest 
beneficiaries of such a change.  The highly educated would benefit because they could increase working 
time and investment in their careers by reducing household production.  Women with children would 
benefit by being able to enter the job market more easily with market-provided alternatives to home 
production, notably childcare facilities.  
 To obtain some insight into the likely impact of increased marketization on the work done by 
German women, we have estimated equations relating work time to the demographic characteristics of 
women in Germany, where market alternatives are limited, and in the US, where market alternatives to 
household production abound.  With market alternatives available, educated women should work 
disproportionately more in the US and women with children should be less deterred from work in the 
US.  In statistical terms, the positive coefficient on education in a work equation should be greater in the 
US than in Germany while the negative coefficient on presence of children should be smaller in the US 
than in Germany. 
 Table 10 presents two sets of calculations designed to test this implication of the greater 
availability of substitutes for household production.  The top calculation gives the coefficients in a logit 
analysis of whether or not someone works.  It shows that education raises the employment of US 
women more than of German women, with a coefficient  (0.109) in the US equation that is substantially 
and significantly higher than that (0.068) in the German equation.  When we look separately at university 
graduates (not shown in the table), the differential effect of education is even stronger.  In addition, we 
obtain a modestly smaller coefficient on the presence of children in the US than in Germany for women 
with children 6–18 but effectively no difference among women with children aged 6 or less.  The 
difference among women with 6–18 year olds may reflect the greater provision of after-school programs 
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in the US. 
The bottom calculation in Table 10 gives the coefficients on the ln of the percentage of work 
time in the market from an analysis limited to women who are in the job market.  It also shows that 
education has a greater impact in increasing market work relative to household time in the US and that 
presence of children less than six years of age is less of a deterrent to work in the US than in Germany.  
The calculations do not demonstrate that the reason for the differences in the impact of education and 
presence of children are the greater availability of market alternatives in the US.  They are, however, 
what we would expect in that situation.   
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
The primary implication of our analysis is that changes in market employment in Germany are intrinsically 
tied to the marketization of household activities.  As long as Germany maintains a more extensive 
household production sector than the US, it is unlikely to reach US levels of employment per adult.  
This, in turn, directs attention at the features of the German economy that have led to less marketization 
of production in Germany than in the US.   
One such factor is the greater size of the tax wedge between working and producing at home in 
Germany than the US due to higher rates of taxation and higher non-wage labor charges in Germany.  
Our estimates in Table 3 suggest that the loss of income from working and buying products in the 
market as opposed to producing at home is 0.30 ln points in Germany compared to .07 ln points in the 
US, for a sizable 0.23 ln points difference.  Another factor is the smaller dispersion of earnings in 
Germany than in the US, which reduces the benefit of working in the market for higher paid workers.  
The more narrow distribution of skills in Germany than in the US shown in scores on adult literacy and 
numeracy (Freeman and Schettkat, 2001b) also helps explain the lesser marketization of household 
activities.  Just as there is less gain from international trade when countries have similar factor 
endowments, there is less gain to be had from market transactions when persons have similar skills.  
Another important potential cause of the employment gap among women is the greater 
proportion of US than of German women with bachelor’s or higher degrees.  About 22% of the 
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American women in working age had a bachelors or higher degree compared to only 11% of German 
women.   
In addition, differences in life style – in how people want to spend their time and money – which 
may reflect more than economic incentives may also play a part.  Although Germans show a higher 
preference for shorter working hours, the differences in attitudes toward work have diminished between 
the US and Germany suggesting that the ‘hard variables’ gained importance. The tax-wedge, the lower 
share of women among high-wage workers, and smaller share of highly educated women are key 
concomitants for the high share of German household production. 
Assuming that we are correct and increased marketization is necessary for any increase in 
employment-population rates, what micro-economic policies might raise employment in Germany?  One 
policy would be to reduce the wedge between market and non-market activity, through some alteration 
in tax rates and social charges on low skill workers.  Another would be to develop additional after-
school programs to allow mothers of school-age children to work or to work longer.  For university 
graduate women, yet additional policies might be needed that our study does not address:  affirmative 
action and flexibility in working hours.  The bottom line is that increasing the employment-population rate 
to US levels requires substantive changes in the way people allocate their time and lives, which goes 
beyond the conventional wisdom on how to create more jobs.  
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Table 1:  Employment–Population Rates by Detailed Service Industries in the US and 
West-Germany [% of the Population 15–64 Years] 
 
 overall men women 
 1970 1995 1970 1995 1970 1995 
USA 
 
industry (incl.agriculture) 23.4 18.7 36.9 28.5 9.8 9.4 
       
services 38.5 53.8 41.6 51.1 32.6 56.4 
health 3.7 6.6 1.7 3.0 5.2 10.1 
 transport 3.9 3.8 6.8 5.8 1.0 1.8 
 communication 1.6 1.3 2.0 1.5 1.1 1.0 
 public utilities 1.0 0.9 1.8 1.6 0.2 0.3 
 wholesale trade 2.6 2.7 4.1 3.9 1.1 1.5 
 retail trade 6.4 8.8 6.7 8.5 5.7 9.1 
 eating, drinking, care 2.5 5.6 1.9 4.8 2.9 6.3 
 finance 2.7 3.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 4.4 
 advertising 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 
 services dwellings 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 
 business services 0.7 1.9 0.7 2.0 0.5 1.8 
 computer, data processing 
services 
0.1 0.7 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.5 
 auto-repair  0.3 0.6 0.6 1.2 0.0 0.1 
 other repair 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.1 
 private households 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.9 
 personal services 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.1 1.3 
 entertainment, sports 0.6 1.5 0.8 1.7 0.4 1.3 
 education, research 5.6 6.8 4.5 4.3 6.2 9.2 
 membership organizations 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.8 
 engineering, architecture services 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.2 
 legal, management consult. 0.5 1.6 0.5 1.5 0.6 1.7 
 government 2.3 3.3 3.0 3.6 1.4 3.0 
 national security 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.4 
 miscellaneous services  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
       
total  61.9 72.5 78.5 79.5 42.4 65.8 
 
 
Source: OECD and CGAS data base. 
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Table 1:  continued 
 
 overall men women 
 1970 1995 1970 1995 1970 1995 
Germany  
 
industry (incl.agriculture) 38.6 24.9 56.3 36.4 22.3 13.1 
       
services 29.1 39.8 33.2 37.4 25.4 42.3 
health 2.0 4.2 1.1 2.2 2.9 6.3 
 transport 2.8 3.0 5.0 4.7 0.7 1.2 
 communication 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.5 0.8 0.9 
 public utilities 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.4 0.1 0.3 
 wholesale trade 2.5 1.8 3.4 2.2 1.6 1.3 
 retail trade 5.2 6.5 4.0 4.5 6.4 8.4 
 eating, drinking, care 1.9 3.5 1.3 2.5 2.4 4.4 
 finance 1.7 2.6 1.9 2.5 1.6 2.7 
 advertising 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 
 services dwellings 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 
 business services 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 
 computer, data processing 
services 
0.0 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.2 
 auto-repair  0.6 0.5 1.0 0.9 0.1 0.1 
 other repair 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
 private households 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.5 
 personal services 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.8 
 entertainment, sports 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.7 
 education, research 2.1 4.0 2.0 3.4 2.1 4.6 
 membership organizations 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.9 
 engineering, architecture 
services 
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.4 
 legal, management consult. 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.8 0.5 1.3 
 government 4.6 5.0 6.7 5.5 2.6 4.5 
 national security 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
 miscellaneous services  0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.6 
       
total  67.7 64.7 89.5 73.9 47.7 55.3 
 
Source:  OECD and CGAS data base. 
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Table 2:  Women by Skill, Earnings and Children 
 USA Germany 
 1970 1989 1995 1970 1989 1995 
 
employment population rates (15–64 years) 
 
       
all women  46.0 64.4 66.5 47.8 51.5 55.9 
       
by child1       
 all mothers with child < 6  54.0 61.5  42.6* 51.1 
 mothers in couples with child < 6  55.7 60.6  49.4* 54.4 
 all women without children  (20–60 
years)  
 79.9 85.2  65.0* 67.3 
       
by skill equivalents2        
       skill equivalent I  57.7 54.0  37.7 38.9 
       skill equivalent II  72.2 71.5  57.0 61.9 
       skill equivalent III  77.8 77.6  66.6 74.1 
       skill equivalent IV  84.3 83.4  72.8 75.9 
       
other measures 
 
composition of couples with a child < 61 
 
  man and woman full-time  32.3 36.5  23.3 20.9 
  man full-time, women part-time  18.3 18.6  19.4 26.3 
  man fullt-time, women not working  38.8 35.2  44.4 41.6 
 
earnings 
share of women in the wage-class [%, in parantheses of the wage-class in overall 
distribrution]3 
 
>= mean <1.33 mean 16.8 
 (24.7) 
37.2 
(20.5) 
39.1 
(19.3) 
16.3 
(34.5) 
24.5 
(35.7) 
30.1 
(34.1) 
>= 1.33 mean < 1.66 mean 19.2 
(9.9) 
33.8 
(11.5) 
41.3 
(11.9) 
5.0 
(11.6) 
3.7 
(12.2) 
5.14 
(12.2) 
>= 1.66 mean 8.4  
(7.2) 
15.4 
(9.3) 
19.5 
(9.8) 
0.0 
(1.4) 
0.3 
(1.8) 
0.3  
(1.4) 
       
 
Source:  OECD Labor Force Statistics for employment–population rates,1 from OECD Employment Outlook 
2001:  pp.134-135, 2Skill equivalents according to Freeman and Schettkat (2001) computed from CGAS, 3the 
mean wage is the mean of the overall wage distribution, computed from CGAS.   
* for Germany 1991. 
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Table 3:  The German Reservation Wage as Derived from Social Assistance and the US 
Minimum Wage 
 
 
 
1995 
Germany 
Social assistance (including a rent subsidy) 1105 
Earned income allowance 200 (18%) 
  
Net monthly reservation income 1305 
  
Hourly net reservation wage  
Average monthly working hours  169 
Uncorrected net hourly reservation wage   
7.72DM 
  
Vacation days per year 31 (12.4% of working days) 
Vacation corrected hourly net reservation wage  
6.87DM 
Social security contrib. Employee (20%) 
Gross reservation wage 8.24DM 
Mean  
28.66DM (German mean) 
In % of the mean 0.29 
  
Wage costs per hour  
Social security contr. Employer  20% 
Paid vacation time  
12.4% 
Wage costs per hour  
11.11DM 
USA 
 
US minimum wage  
4.25$ 
Vacation days per year  
10 (4% of working days) 
Vacation corrected minimum wage   
4.42$ 
In % of the mean .34 (US mean) 
Social security employers’ contribution 7.5% 
Wage costs per hour 4.75$ 
 
Sources:  Social assistance level from German statistical yearbooks; earned income allowance:  Scharpf (1997), 
vacation, working hours, and social security contribution from Bundesminister fuer Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1997.  
Income taxes are not included in the calculations. 
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Table 4:  Private Final Consumption Expenditure in the US and in Germany, Current 
Prices (Shares in %) 
 
  United States Germany 
  1970 1980 1994 1970 1980 1994 
Food, Beverages, Tobacco and 
Miscellaneous  
32.9 31.9 30.3 35.1 31.1 28.6 
 Food & Beverages 18.6 16.5 12.3 27.9 22.9 18.4 
 Tobacco 1.9 1.4 1.3 2.8 2.2 1.8 
 Expend. in Restaurants etc. & Misc. 
goods and services 
12.5 14.0 16.7 4.5 6.1 8.3 
Clothing and Footwear 9.1 7.6 7.2 10.5 9.5 7.7 
Gross rent, Fuel and Power 19.9 21.7 22.8 16.6 19.7 23.5 
 Fuel and Power 3.4 4.7 3.4 3.9 5.7 3.9 
 Other 16.5 17.0 19.5 12.7 14.0 19.5 
Furniture, Furnishing and Household 
equipment 
8.0 7.3 6.7 10.3 10.1 9.5 
Transport and Communication 16.5 18.3 17.2 14.3 14.9 17.0 
 Personal transport equipment 5.3 4.8 5.9 4.0 3.9 5.2 
 Other 11.1 13.5 11.4 10.4 11.0 11.8 
Recreational, Entertainmetn & 
Cultural Services 
9.4 9.6 12.8 10.4 10.6 10.4 
Personal Care 3.5 3.3 3.4 2.0 1.8 1.8 
Final Domestic Cons. Exp. (excl. 
Medical care) 
99.2 99.8 100.5 99.4 97.8 98.4 
Direct purchases abroad by residents 1.2 1.0 1.4 3.1 4.2 4.9 
Direct purchases in the domestic market 
by non-residents 
0.5 0.8 1.9 2.5 2.0 3.3 
Final Cons. Exp. (excl. Medical care) 
by residents 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source:  OECD National Product and Income Accounts, CD-Rom. 
Expenditures of non-profit institutions serving households are included in household expenditures. 
Medical care expenditures are excluded from Final Domestic Consumption Expenditures and Total. 
Original category “Miscellaneous Goods and Services” is included in “Food etc.”, except for sub-
category “Personal Care”. 
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Table 5:  Allocation of Time to Eating, Preparing Meals and Shopping [Hours per Week] 
 
 US Germany (West) 
 total men women total men women 
total time eating, preparing meals 11.5 9.3 13.3 15.5 11.6 19.5 
   eating  7.5 7.6 7.4 9.3 9.1 9.5 
   preparing meals, cleaning after meals  4.0 1.7 5.9 6.2 2.5 10.0 
       
travelling for personal need 2.0 2.0 2.0 .4 .4 .5 
overall shopping time 5.5 4.2 6.7 5.8 4.8 6.8 
Total, these forms of household production 19.0 15.5 22.0 21.7 16.8 26.8 
 
Source:  Time-use data sets described in Appendix. 
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Table 6:  Time-use in the US and in Germany, mean hours per week, annual average, 18–
64 years 11 
 
total men women time use category 
 
 
US Germany US Germany US Germany 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
total working time 53.6 54.6 54.2 54.6 53.0 54.7 
       
  market work 31.7 26.4 39.1 35.2 25.4 17.7 
       
  household 
production 
21.0 27.0 14.1 17.9 26.8 36.1 
       
personal time 75.2 74.3 73.3 73.1 76.7 75.6 
       
leisure 38.9 38.2 40.1 39.5 37.9 36.9 
  TV use 17.3 11.8 18.2 12.7 16.6 10.8 
       
total hours per week  168 168 168 168 168 168 
 
Source:  Time-Use Data.  For details see data section in Appendix I. 
market work includes:  actual time at work (including breaks), commuting time. 
household production includes:  child care, housework (cleaning, preparation of meals, repair). 
personal time/leisure includes:  groom, eating, sleeping, leisure. 
 
                                                 
11  Share of Employment Statuses in 1991/92 (Germany), 1993/94 in the US  
 total employed full-time part-time not employed 
 Germany 
men 100.0 81.7 79.0 2.7 18.3 
women 100.0 55.5 36.3 19.5 44.2 
 USA 
men 100.0 84.6 76.4 8.0 15.6 
women 100.0 68.8 54.0 14.8 31.2 
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Table 7:  Time Allocated to Child Care by Gender, and Children [Hours per Week] 
 
US Germany 
men women men women 
 
 total at least 
1 child 
under 
18 
years  
with at 
least 1 
child 
under 6 
years  
 total with at 
least 1 
child 
under 
18 
years  
with at 
least 1 
child 
under 6 
years  
         
share in 
population 
(%) 
46 54 26 11 50 50 17 7 
         
time spend 
on child care 
1.3 4.1 7.1 11.0 1.8 4.8 11.6 20.4 
 
Source:  Time-use data set. 
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Table 8:  Market Work-Orientation of Germans* and Americans, by Gender 
  Males Females 
  1989 1997 1989 1997 
  G USA G USA G USA G USA 
   
How Hard do You Work? 
 
A Only as hard as I have to 15 9 8 11 18 6 6 6 
B Hard but not if interference 
with rest of life 
48 29 41 36 50 34 36 40 
C As best as I can even if it 
interferes with rest of life 
31 62 52 53 31 59 57 55 
          
 Difference C-A 16 53 44 42 13 53 51 49 
   
Work Hours Preferences 
A More hours/ more pay 12 38 22 32 15 28 19 25 
B Same hours/ same pay 77 57 68 58 75 67 70 64 
C Less hours/ less pay 11 5 10 9 9 5 11 11 
          
 Difference C-A -1 -33 -12 -23 -6 -23 -8 -14 
   
Job is Just a Way to Make Money 
A Agree 39 24 36 23 26 20 26 25 
B Neither Nor 17 17 10 19 16 18 10 15 
C Disagree 46 59 54 58 58 62 64 60 
          
 Difference C-A 7 35 18 35 32 42 38 35 
   
Would take job even if Money not needed 
A Agree 49 62 68 60 50 61 69 60 
B Neither Nor 14 16 9 17 12 17 7 15 
C Disagree 37 22 23 23 38 22 24 35 
          
 Difference C-A 7 35 18 35 12 39 45 25 
Source:  Working Hard from ISSP question “Which of the following statements best describes your feelings 
about your job?” (1) I only work as hard as I have to; (2) I work hard, but not that it interferes with the rest of my 
life; (3) I make a point of doing the best work I can even if it sometimes interferes with the rest of my life. 
 Hours Preferences from ISSP question, “Think of the number of hours you work and the money you 
make on your main job, including regular overtime.  If you had only one of three choices, which of the following 
would you prefer (1) Work longer hours and earn more money; (2) Work the same number of hours and earn the 
same money; (3) Work fewer hours and earn less money? 
 Job is Just a Way to Make Money from IISP Statement, “A job is just a way of earning money – no 
more”, please tick one box:  (1) Strongly agree; (2) Agree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Disagree; (5) 
Strongly disagree.  Agree:  (1) + (2), Neither Nor (3), Disagree (4) + (5). 
Would take job even if money not needed from ISSP question, “Do you agree or disagree ….     I would enjoy 
having a paid job even if I did not the money?”; (1) Strongly agree; (2) Agree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) 
Disagree; (5) Strongly disagree.  Agree:  (1) + (2), Neither Nor (3), Disagree (4) + (5). 
* Germans living in West-Germany. 
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Table 9:  Potential Employment Effects of Increased Marketization of Activity in Germany 
 
CHANGE IN MARKET SECTOR 
 
  Share of German Consumption on Restaurants, etc   8.3 
   % increase to reach US share (16.7)   100% 
 
  Employment/Adult in Restaurants etc in Germany   3.5 
 
  Effect of 100% increase in consumption share on emp/adults 3.5 
 
  Aggregate Increase in hours worked at 30 hours week  105 
 
     CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD SECTOR 
 
  Effect on Household Production time 
Decline from 6.2 hours to 4.0 hours of preparing meals 
Cleaning after meals     2.2 hours  
 
 Aggregate decrease in hours in food preparation    220 
 
 
Implicit Tradeoff in Hours of household work for market work     2.10 
Aggregate Increase in “Free time”                 105 
 
 
Source:  Consumption shares from Table 2; employment ratios from Table 1; household time 
from Table 3. 
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Table 10:  Regressions of participation in employment and hours in market work and home 
production on years of education, age, and children, women (25 to 64 years) 
 
Variables USA Germany (West) 
 coefficient standard error Coefficien
t 
standard 
error 
  
participation in market work LOGIT 
  
independent variables:  
years of education 0.234 0.021 0.080 0.011 
age -0.051 0.004 -0.065 0.003 
child < 6 -1.348 0.141 -1.352 0.086 
child 6 to 18 -0.233 0.134 -0.283 0.065 
constant 0.187 0.359 2.739 0.233 
     
n  2825  7832 
Prob Chi2  0  0 
Pseudo R2  0.1061  0.0573 
     
     
ln (hours of market 
work/hours of total work) 
OLS 
  
independent variables:  
years of education 0.025 0.012 0.018 0.004 
age -0.010 0.003 -0.016 0.001 
child < 6 -0.494 0.099 -0.701 0.033 
child 6 to 18 -0.377 0.082 -0.376 0.025 
constant 1.269 0.226 1.345 0.091 
     
n  1775  4915 
Prob > F  0  0 
R2 adjusted  0.025  0.092 
Source:  Computations are based on the time-use data files described in the Appendix. 
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Figure 1:  Scatterplot of the US–German Difference in Industry-Specific Employment–
Population Rates and the US–German Differences In Industry-Specific Relative Wages 
(1995) 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Scatterplot of the Difference Between the US and Germany in the Difference of 
Industry-Specific Employment–Population Rates Versus the Difference in Wage Growth 
(1970–1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
difference in wage growth 
35.765 366.531 
-334.876  
100.41  
difference in the growth of employment-population rates 
  
 
difference in wages [US – Germany]  
-.266404  .48234 
-172.197  
278.419  difference in employment-population rates [US – Germany]  
Source:  Computations based on the CGAS. 
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Appendix I:  The Data 
 
The data used in this study is based on time budget surveys.  The German data are derived from the 
scientific use file (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1999) ‘Wo bleibt die Zeit?’.  The data used covers the 
former West Germany because the special situation in East Germany (in 1991/1992) may be not 
representative for time-use.  The data is representative of German households only; i.e. households of 
non-Germans living in Germany were not included.  The data was collected by means of diaries and 
personal interviews between autumn 1991 and summer 1992 and covers about 32,0000 diaries, 
representing about 16,000 individuals (each person kept diaries for 2 consecutive days).  In the present 
study, only the adult population (18 to 64 years) is included.  This left 17,998 diaries. 
 The US data (for details, see Triplett, 1995) was collected by the Survey Research Center at 
the University of Maryland and covers the period from September 1992 to October 1994.  The data 
was collected by means of telephone interviews.  Each quarter of data collection was an independent 
random sample but multiple chances of selection across quarters were avoided.  Weekend and 
weekdays were distinguished.  The interviewees had to list all their activities for the day before the 
interview in a 24-hour diary with detailed activity and location coding together with information on 
demographic background.  In households with more than one adult, the interviewee was selected at 
random.  A total of 9,386 interviews were conducted, 6,316 representing weekdays and 3,070 
representing weekends.  The present study has used only the time of adults (18 years to 64 years), 
leaving us with a sample size of 6,062.  The Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin kindly did the computations 
because we did not have direct access to the individual data. 
 The two data sets have been made compatible with respect both to the time-use categories and 
the period covered (in both countries, the whole year).  The US data did not provide information on 
wages and the German data provided only data on net household income in the preceding month.  For 
this reason, we estimated the wages used in this analysis from wage information available in the CGAS 
(Comparable German American Structural Database, see Freeman and Schettkat, 2000).  Although 
wages are only estimated, the advantage of this procedure is that potential wages are assigned to those 
persons who are not actually in employment.  The correlation between the estimated wage and the net 
household income for those households with a single income was .64 (significant at 1%). 
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